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Abstract
Mobile sensing has become a promising paradigm for mobile users to obtain information by task crowdsourcing. However, due
to the social preferences of mobile users, the quality of sensing reports may be impacted by the underlying social attributes and
selfishness of individuals. Therefore, it is crucial to consider the social impacts and trustworthiness of mobile users when selecting
task participants in mobile sensing. In this paper, we propose a Social Aware Crowdsourcing with Reputation Management
(SACRM) scheme to select the well-suited participants and allocate the task rewards in mobile sensing. Specifically, we consider
the social attributes, task delay and reputation in crowdsourcing and propose a participant selection scheme to choose the well-
suited participants for the sensing task under a fixed task budget. A report assessment and rewarding scheme is also introduced to
measure the quality of the sensing reports and allocate the task rewards based the assessed report quality. In addition, we develop a
reputation management scheme to evaluate the trustworthiness and cost performance ratio of mobile users for participant selection.
Theoretical analysis and extensive simulations demonstrate that SACRM can efficiently improve the crowdsourcing utility and
effectively stimulate the participants to improve the quality of their sensing reports.
Keywords: Mobile sensing, crowdsensing, social impact, reputation, participant selection, crowdsourcing
1. Introduction
We have witnessed recently the dramatic proliferation of mo-
bile computing devices such as smartphones and tablet comput-
ers [1]. Since these devices are generally equipped with a set
of versatile sensors, mobile sensing (also known as participa-
tory sensing or urban sensing) has emerged as a new horizon
for ubiquitous sensing [2]. In a typical mobile sensing appli-
cation [3, 4], a data requester first publishes a sensing task to
crowdsource, and then selects a number of mobile users inter-
ested in the task to collect the desired data. Once the partici-
pants finish the sensing task, they submit their sensing reports
to the data requester and earn their task rewards. Such a new
paradigm of information collection brings great benefits (e.g.,
efficiency and low cost) and also challenging issues by task
crowdsourcing [5].
One of the challenging issues in mobile sensing is to select
participants for crowdsourced sensing tasks. A few of research
efforts have been invested to address the participant selection
problem. Reddy et. al. [6] develop a recruitment framework
to select well-suited participants for sensing tasks based on
the spatio-temporal availability and personal reputation. They
highlight participant selection should highly depend on the lo-
cation and time availability and trustworthiness of the partici-
pants. However, little attention has been paid to the underlying
social attributes of mobile users (e.g. interests, living area),
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which are critical for task crowdsourcing [7, 8, 9], especially
for participant selection. For a specific sensing task, it gener-
ally has a set of interested social attributes, and a large social
attribute overlap between the task and mobile user indicates a
potential matching and high task quality. For instance, if the
published task is “Find the cheapest Coca Cola in the Waterloo
city”, the mobile users whose social attributes include “Shop-
ping” and “Waterloo” might be preferred to be recruited in the
task. While the published task changes to “Find an unoccu-
pied basketball court in the University of Toronto”, the mobile
users whose social attributes include “Sporting” and “Toronto”
should be preferred. Therefore, it is of great significance to
consider the impact of social attributes on crowdsourcing, es-
pecially on the participant selection.
Another challenge in mobile sensing is to evaluate the trust-
worthiness of sensing reports and participants, and fairly al-
locate task rewards. In the presence of malicious partici-
pants, mobile crowdsensing is vulnerable to various types of
attacks, e.g., denial-of-service attack [10] and data pollution at-
tack [11, 3], etc. Reputation system is a promising technique
and has been widely used in trustworthiness evaluation for mo-
bile sensing [12, 13]. Wang et. al. [3] propose a reputation
framework to evaluate the trustworthiness of sensing reports
and participants. Huang et. al. [11] employ the Gompertz func-
tion to compute the device reputation score and evaluate the
trustworthiness of contributed data. However, most of the exit-
ing works only focus on trustworthiness evaluation for partici-
pants, without adjusting their task rewards based on the quality
of their sensing reports. Such that, the malicious users can still
earn enough task rewards before their reputation goes to a low
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value. Therefore, in order to defend this attack and economi-
cally stimulate participants’ contributions, it is crucial to adap-
tively allocate the task rewards to the participants according to
their sensing report quality.
In this paper, we propose a Social Aware Crowdsourcing
with Reputation Management (SACRM) scheme to select the
well-suited participants and allocate task rewards in mobile
sensing. Compared with the existing works, we synthetically
consider the social attributes, task delay and personal reputa-
tion in mobile sensing and define a utility function to quantify
the effect of the three factors on crowdsourcing. The major con-
tributions of our work are four folds.
• We propose a participant selection scheme to choose the
well-suited participants for sensing tasks and maximize the
crowdsourcing utility under a fixed task budget. The proposed
scheme consists of two participant selection algorithms, a dy-
namic programming algorithm to achieve the optimal solution
and a fully polynomial time approximation algorithm to achieve
the (1-)-approximate solution.
• We propose a report assessment and rewarding scheme to
measure the quality of sensing reports and allocate task rewards.
Both of the report veracity and report delay are considered as
two quality metrics for report assessment. And the task rewards
are allocated according to the assessment results.
• We develop a reputation management scheme to evaluate
the trustworthiness and cost performance ratio of mobile users
for participant selection, which can stimulate participants to im-
prove their report quality.
• We theoretically analyze the performance of the proposed
participant selection algorithms. Extensive simulations demon-
strate the effectiveness and efficiency of the SACRM scheme.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Related
works are reviewed in Section 2. In Section 3, we provide
an overview of the system model and design goals. Section 4
presents the details of the proposed SACRM scheme. The the-
oretical analysis of SACRM is described in Section 5. We eval-
uate the performance of SACRM by extensive simulations in
Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and intro-
duces our future work.
2. Related Work
As an emerging information collection mechanism, crowd-
sourcing has been extensively studied in mobile sensing. Most
of the related works focus on studying the incentive mecha-
nisms to stimulate the participation of mobile users for crowd-
sourcing [4, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18].
Dynamic pricing is an effective incentive mechanism widely
used in mobile sensing [4, 14, 15, 19]. Yang et. al. [4] propose
two incentive mechanisms to stimulate mobile users’ participa-
tion respectively for platform-centric and user-centric mobile
sensing. For the platform-centric model, they present a Stack-
elberg game [20] based incentive mechanism to maximize the
utility of the platform. For the user-centric model, they de-
sign an auction-based incentive mechanism that is proved to be
computationally efficient, individually rational, profitable and
truthful. Jaimes et. al. [14] propose a recurrent reverse auction
incentive mechanism using a greedy algorithm to select a rep-
resentative subset of users according to their locations under a
fixed budget. In [15], the authors develop and evaluate a reverse
auction based dynamic pricing incentive mechanism to stimu-
late mobile users’ participation and reduce the incentive cost.
Besides the dynamic pricing mechanism, personal demand and
social relationship are introduced into the incentive mechanism
study [16, 21, 18]. Luo et. al. [16] link the incentive to per-
sonal demand for consuming compelling services. Based on
the demand principle, two incentive schemes, called Incentive
with Demand Fairness (IDF) and Iterative Tank Filling (ITF),
are proposed to maximize fairness and social welfare, respec-
tively.
The majority of the existing incentive mechanisms are ben-
eficial to stimulate the user participation, however, data as-
sessment and reputation management are desired and criti-
cal to evaluate the trustworthiness of sensing data and mobile
users [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 11]. Zhang et. al. [22] propose a ro-
bust trajectory estimation strategy, called TrMCD, to alleviate
the negative influence of abnormal crowdsourced user trajec-
tories and identify the normal and abnormal users, as well as
to mitigate the impact of the spatial unbalanced crowdsourced
trajectories. Huang et. al. [11] employ the Gompertz func-
tion [27] to compute the device reputation score and evaluate
the trustworthiness of the contributed data. Since the reputation
scores associated with the specific contributions can be used to
identify the participants, privacy issues are highlighted in the
reputation system design of mobile sensing [3, 23, 26]. Wang
et. al. [3] propose a privacy-preserving reputation framework
to evaluate the trustiness of the sensing reports and the partici-
pants based on the blind signatures. Christin et. al. [23] propose
an anonymous reputation framework, called as IncogniSense,
which generates periodic pseudonyms by blind signature and
transfers reputation between these pseudonyms.
Recently, participant selection has been studied to achieve
the optimal crowdsourcing utility [6, 18]. Reddy et. al. [6] de-
velop a recruitment framework to enable the data requester to
identify well-suited participants for the sensing task based on
geographic and temporal availability as well as the participant
reputation. The proposed recruitment system approximately
maximizes the coverage over a specific area and time period
under a limited campaign budget with a greedy algorithm. Am-
intoosi et. al. [18] propose a recruitment framework for social
participatory sensing to identify and select suitable and trust-
worthy participants in the friend circle, by leveraging the mul-
tihop friendship relations. However, they do not consider the
social attributes of mobile users and adaptive rewards alloca-
tion, which play a significant role in crowdsourcing design.
3. System Model and Design Goals
3.1. System Model
We consider a typical mobile sensing system, which is ap-
plied in [3, 4] and illustrated as Fig. 1. The system consists of
a mobile sensing application platform and a large number of
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Figure 1: Architecture of Mobile Sensing System
mobile users. The application platform generally resides in the
cloud and consists of multiple sensing servers, and the mobile
users connect to the platform through WiFi or cellular network.
Each mobile user can publish his1 sensing task on the platform,
called as data requester. And the users who are finally assigned
the sensing task are called as participants. We describe a com-
plete mobile sensing process as follows.
At first, a data requester has a sensing task and task require-
ments (e.g., task deadline and task budget), and publishes it on
the platform to recruit mobile users to finish it (Step 1). The
mobile users, who are interested in participating in the sens-
ing tasks, then estimate the cost and expected delay to finish
this task and apply to participate in the task with their applica-
tion information (e.g., bid price, expected task delay). (Step 2).
Then, the data requester chooses a subset of applicants to take
this sensing task based on their application information (Step
3). The participants collect the required data information and
report them to the platform. The reported data are processed
by the sensing servers and then provided to the data requester
(Step 4). After that, the data requester would assess the qual-
ity of sensing reports and gives a feedback (e.g., sensing re-
ports evaluation, allocated rewards, reputation evaluation), to
the platform (Step 5). Finally, the platform processes the feed-
back (e.g., reputation update), and then returns it to the partici-
pants (Step 6).
All the procedures in the mobile sensing system are involved
in the crowdsourcing and have attracted a number of research
efforts. In this paper, we particularly focus on three key issues,
i.e., how to choose the applicants to take the sensing task in Step
3, and how to evaluate the sensing reports and reputation, and
develop an adaptive rewarding scheme in Step 5, as well as the
feedback processing (e.g., reputation update and management)
in Step 6.
3.2. Design Goals
The proposed SACRM aims to select the well-suited partici-
pants for a specific sensing task and adaptively reward the par-
ticipants based on the quality of their sensing reports. More
1No specific gender here, and the same applies in the following paper.
Figure 2: Overview of the SACRM scheme
specifically, the objectives of SACRM can be summarized as
two-fold.
(1) Participant Selection. Since the social attribute, task
delay and reputation are crucial for the task crowdsourcing,
SACRM should consider these factors and be able to select the
well-suited participants for the sensing tasks and improve the
crowdsourcing utility.
(2) Accurate Sensing Report Assessment and Adaptive Re-
ward Allocation. Since some malicious participants may submit
bad sensing reports or contribute noting for their participated
sensing tasks, SACRM should be able to accurately assess the
submitted sensing reports and adaptively allocate the rewards
to the participants based on the assessed report quality.
4. The Proposed SACRM Scheme
The proposed SACRM scheme consists of three components:
(1) Participant Selection, (2) Sensing Report Assessment and
Adaptive Rewarding, and (3) Reputation Management. In Par-
ticipant Selection, we define a utility function to quantify the ef-
fect of social attributes, task delay and reputation on the crowd-
sourcing and formulate the participant selection problem as a
combination optimization problem. Two participant selection
algorithms are proposed to select the well-suited participants
for the sensing task and maximize the crowdsourcing utility. In
Sensing Report Assessment and Adaptive Rewarding, we first
evaluate the quality of submitted sensing reports in terms of the
report veracity and report delay. And then, we propose a re-
warding scheme to allocate task rewards based on the report
assessment results. In Reputation Management, the reputation
of the participant is updated according to both of the assessed
report quality and the cost performance ratio of the participant.
The overview of the SACRM is described as 2. To assist the
understanding of the following paper, we summarized the fre-
quently used notations in Table 1.
4.1. Participant Selection
In SACRM, we consider three main factors, including social
attributes, expected task delay and reputation, for participant
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Table 1: Frequently Used Notations
Notation Meaning
U Set of mobile users {u1, ..., un}
Pt Set of participants in task t, and Pt ⊆ U
Bt Budget for finishing t
dt Deadline of task t
bit ui’s bid price for t
dit ui’s expected delay for finishing t
eit Expected utility of choosing ui for t
S Ai Set of ui’s social attributes
TAt Set of social attributes interested by t
R(ui) Reputation value of ui
Ieit Amplified e
i
t to be non-negative integer
srit ui’s sensing report for task t
Φit Veracity score of sr
i
t
ζ it Delay deviation score of sr
i
t
vit Final report assessment score of sr
i
t
tpit Allocated reward to ui for participating t
rit ui’s evaluated reputation score for participating t
selection. To make it clearer, we define the three factors as
follows.
1. Social Attributes. Social attributes are the characteris-
tics or features of an individual in his social life, such as in-
terests, friend circle, living area. Generally, different tasks
are interested in various social attributes and a large social at-
tribute overlap between the task and the user indicates a poten-
tial matching and a high task quality.
2. Expected Task Delay. The expected task delay for a spe-
cific task highly depends on the user’s location and time avail-
ability. For each user i and task t, the expected delay is defined
as the expected duration from the time when i is assigned the
task t until the time i can finish this task. The expected delay
indicates the timeliness of the crowdsourcing task, which is an
important factor for participant selection, particularly in delay-
sensitive tasks.
3. Reputation. Due to the selfishness of the mobile users,
a crucial part of the system is to assess if the quality and re-
liability of the reported sensed data deserve its bid price. We
define the reputation of a mobile user ui, denoted as R(ui), is
a synthesized evaluation on the past sensing reports sent by ui,
as perceived by the platform. The platform maintains a repu-
tation database to record the reputation value of each mobile
user. When a new mobile user registers with the platform, the
platform creates a unique ID and initializes an initial reputation
value R0 for the new user.
4.1.1. Problem Formulation
Participant selection is to select the well-suited mobile users
to participate in the sensing task based on the task requirements
and the application information, and hence to maximize the
utility of the data requester. Therefore, we formulate the par-
ticipant selection problem as follows.
A data requester DR publishes a task t and the task require-
ments of t on the platform. The requirements of t include the
task budget Bt for t, the interested social attributes set, denoted
by TAt = {ta1, ta2, ..., tak}, and the delay threshold dt that means
the expected delay should be not larger than dt. There is a set of
mobile users, denoted byU = {u1, u2, ..., un}, interested in par-
ticipating in the task t. Here, n ≥ 2. For each ui, he has a set of
personal social attributes, denoted by S Ai = {sai1, sai2, ..., saiτi },
and a reputation value denoted as R(ui). In addition, ui esti-
mates the expected delay dit to finish t and the bid price b
i
t for t,
where bit ≤ Bt. And then ui submits it to the platform, when ui
is applying for the task t. We denote the expected utility of DR
as eit if he chooses the user ui to undertake the task t, and the
total expected utility of DR obtained from the crowdsourcing
as Et. According to the factor definitions, eit is determined by
the overlap of TAt and S Ai, dit and R(ui), which will be detailed
in the following section. Therefore, participant selection is to
choose a subset Pt ofU to participate in the task t, to maximize
the Et. The problem is mathematically formulated as choosing
P to
Maximize Et =
∑
i∈Pt
eit; (1)
Subject to

∑
i∈Pt b
i
t ≤ Bt;
dit ≤ dt, for i ∈ Pt;
bit ≤ Bt, for i ∈ Pt.
(2)
4.1.2. Utility Function
We formulate the participant selection problem above, where
the expected utility eit of DR choosing ui to participate in the
task t is not accurately defined. In this section, we first define
the utility functions of the social attributes, expected task delay
and reputation to quantify the effect of them on participant se-
lection. For a specific task t, the expected utility eit of choosing
the user ui can be determined by the overlap of S Ai and TAt , the
expected delay dit and the reputation R(ui). Without loss of gen-
erality, we set eit consists of f (S Ai,TAt), g(d
i
t , dt) and h(R(ui)).
Here, f (S Ai,TAt), g(dit , dt) and h(R(ui)) denote the utility func-
tions of social attributes overlap, expected delay and reputation
value respectively. In order to facilitate the comparison of each
utility eit, we set 0 < e
i
t ≤ 1.
The interested social attributes set of the task t indicates
the user with more common social attributes is expected to
bring more benefits [10, 28], which is denoted by TAt =
{ta1, ta2, ..., tak}. Therefore, for each users ui, the utility func-
tion of social attributes overlap f (S Ai,TAt) should be linearly
dependent on the overlap ratio of TAt and S Ai. We define
f (S Ai,TAt) as
f (S Ai,TAt) = (1 − α) |S Ai ∩ TAt ||TAt | + α (3)
where |TAt | denotes the number of elements in TAt; |S Ai ∩ TAt |
denotes the number of common social attributes between S Ai
and TAt; α denotes the default utility for the users without com-
mon social attributes with TAt and 0 < α < 1.
Expected task delay is another factor that should be consid-
ered in participant selection. For each user ui, the expected de-
lay varies with the different sensing tasks. If the expected delay
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dit of ui does not exceed the delay threshold dt, ui is a participant
candidate of the task t. Since a lower expected delay indicates a
quicker sensing report, the delay utility function g(dit , dt) should
decrease with the increment of dit . Thus, we define g(d
i
t , dt) as
g(dit , dt) = (1 − β)(1 − exp (dit − dt)) + β, if dit ≤ dt (4)
where β denotes the default utility for the user with dit = dt and
0 < β < 1. The value of g(dit , dt) equals to β when d
i
t = dt.
While g(dit , dt) approaches to 1 if d
i
t is close to 0. The exponent
function is adopted to stimulate a smaller expected delay, since
g(dit , dt) significantly decreases when d
i
t is close to dt.
Reputation is the last but absolutely not the least factor that
is considered in participant selection. It indicates the quality of
the sensing reports that the mobile user submitted in his past
sensing tasks and the trustworthiness and cost performance ra-
tio of the mobile user. Therefore, the reputation utility function
h(R(ui)) should be a monotonically increasing function. We set
the maximum reputation value as Rm and the minimum repu-
tation value as Rs, then we have Rs ≤ R(ui) ≤ Rm. Thus, the
h(R(ui)) is defined as
h(R(ui)) =
γ + (1 − γ) ln (1 + λ) ; if R0 ≤ R(ui) ≤ Rmγ exp(R(ui) − R0); if Rs ≤ R(ui) < R0 (5)
where λ =
(e − 1)(R(ui) − R0)
Rm − R0 ; R0 is an initial reputation value
for a new mobile user; γ denotes the default utility for the user
with R(ui) = R0 and 0 < γ < 1. The γ can be set as a neutral
value 0.5, since we have 0 < h(R(ui)) ≤ 1. The exponent func-
tion makes the reputation value decrease sharply if R(ui) < R0,
and the logarithm function markedly increases the reputation
value if R(ui) ≥ R0.
Combining the Eq. (3), (6) and (5), we define the utility func-
tion eit of choosing the user ui as
eit = ws · f (S Ai,TAt) + wd · g(dit , dt) + wr · h(R(ui)) (6)
where ws, wd and wr denote the weights of social attributes,
delay and reputation respectively; 0 ≤ ws,wd,wr ≤ 1 and ws +
wd + wr = 1.
For different mobile sensing tasks, task requirements might
be various and hence the criteria of participant selection vary in
each task too. For instance, expected task delay should be the
dominating factor in participant selection of the delay-sensitive
sensing tasks, such as “Take a photo for the Davis Centre build-
ing of the University of Waterloo in 5 minutes”. So, we can
increase the weight of the expected delay utility, i.e., wd and set
smaller values to ws and wr. Correspondingly, ws should be in-
creased for the speciality-sensitive sensing tasks and wr should
be improved for the verasity-sensitive tasks. In summary, we
can dynamically adjust the values of the three weights to fit for
the various task requirements.
Note that, the values of f (S Ai,TAt), g(dit , dt) and h(R(ui)) are
in (0, 1]. It means the value of eit is also in (0, 1], which is useful
for the utility comparison in participant selection.
4.1.3. Proposed Participant Selection Algorithms
Since the utility function eit has been determined in the previ-
ous section, the objective function of participant selection can
be rewritten as
Et =
∑
i∈P
(
ws · f (S Ai,TAt) + wd · g(dit , dt) + wr · h(R(ui))
)
(7)
In this subsection, we describe the participant selection algo-
rithm in detail. We first prove that finding an optimal participant
set for the task t is an NP-hard problem (i.e., can be reduced to
the 0-1 Knapsack Problem [29]).
Theorem 1. The participant selection algorithm is NP-hard.
Proof. We aim to reduce our problem to the 0-1 Knapsack
Problem: Give n items {z1, z2, ..., zn} where zi has a value vi|vi ≥
0 and weight wi|wi ≥ 0. The maximum weight that we can
carry in the bag is W. xi = 0 or 1 denotes if the item zi should
be put into the bag. The 0-1 Knapsack Problem is to determine
{x1, x2, ..., xn} to
maximize V =
n∑
i=1
vixi,
subject to
n∑
i=1
wixi ≤ W.
Then we construct our participant selection problem as follows.
Denote P1 = {p1, p2, ..., pn1 } as the set of participant candidates
excluding the ones with the expected delay larger than dt or
the bid price larger than Bt. We use x j = 0 or 1 to denote
if the candidate p j should be chosen to participate in the task
t. Then the participant selection problem changes to determine
{x1, x2, ..., xn1 } to
maximize Et =
n1∑
j=1
e jt x j,
subject to
n1∑
j=1
b jt x j ≤ Bt.
Therefore, the 0-1 Knapsack Problem is successfully reduced
to the participant selection problem, which finishes the proof.
Since the participant selection problem is proved as an NP-
hard problem, the optimal solution can not be achieved by a
polynomial time algorithm, but it can be obtained by a pseudo-
polynomial time algorithm. We first make some modifications
to our problem. Let P1 = {p1, p2, ..., pn1 } as the set of par-
ticipant candidates. We map the utility set {e1t , e2t , ..., en1t } into
non-negative integers {Ie1t , Ie2t , ..., Ien1t } by multiplying each of
them by a amplification factor δ. Define Iemaxt as the maximum
value in the amplified utility set. For each i ∈ {1, ..., n} and k ∈
{1, ...,∑ Ieit}, we define A[i, k] = min {∑ij=1 b jt | ∑ij=1 Ie jt = k}
and
• A[i, k] is subset of P1 whose total utility is exactly k and
whose total payment is minimized;
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Algorithm 1: The Dynamic Programming Participant Se-
lection Algorithm
input : The participant candidate set P1[1, ..., n], the bid
price set b[1, ..., n], and Bt, TAt, dt,
{S A[1], ..., S A[n]}, {dt[1], ..., dt[1]}, {R[1], ...,R[n]};
output: The selected participant set P, the optimal utility
value opt;
1 for i from 1 to n do
2 et[i]← ws · f (S A[i],TAt)+wd ·g(dt[i], dt)+wr ·h(R[i]);
3 Iet[i]← et[i] · δ;
4 end
5 A[0, 0]← 0;
6 for k from 0 to Bt do
7 A[0, k]← Bt + 1;
8 end
9 for i from 1 to n do
10 for j from 0 to
∑
Iet[i] do
11 if Iet[i] ≤ j &&
A[i − 1, j − Iet[i]] + b[i] < A[i − 1, j] then
12 A[i, j]← A[i − 1, j − Iet[i]] + b[i];
13 z[i, j]← 1;
14 else
15 A[i, j]← A[i − 1, j];
16 z[i, j]← 0;
17 end
18 end
19 end
20 opt ← 0;
21 for j from 0 to
∑
Iet[i] do
22 if opt ≤ j && A[n, j] ≤ Bt then
23 opt ← j/δ;
24 end
25 end
26 BB← opt · δ;
27 for i from n downto 1 do
28 if z[i, BB] == 1 then
29 P← P + P1[i];
30 BB← BB − bt[i];
31 end
32 end
33 return P and opt;
• A[0, 0] = 0 and for each k ∈ {1, ...,∑ Ieit}, we have
A[0, k] = Bt + 1.
Then, we can recursively calculate the A[i + 1, k] as
A[i + 1, k] =
A[i, k], if Iei+1t > k;min{A[i, k], A[i, k − Iei+1t ] + bit}, if Iei+1t ≤ k.
Therefore, the optimal utility is max{k | A[n1, k] ≤ Bt}. We
describe the pseudo code for the dynamic programming partic-
ipant selection algorithm as Alg. 1.
The time complexity and space complexity of Alg. 1 are
O(n
∑
Iet[i]) ≤ O(n · nIemaxt ) and O(n
∑
Iet[i]), where Iemaxt
Algorithm 2: participant selection - FPTAS
input : The approximation error  > 0, and the same
inputs as Alg. 1;
output: The selected participant set P′ , the approximated
optimal utility value s;
1 for i from 1 to n do
2 Iet[i]← et[i] · δ;
3 end
4 Find the maximum value Iemaxt from Iet[1, ..., n];
5 Q←  · Ie
max
t
n
;
6 for i from 1 to n do
7 Ie
′
t[i]←
⌊
Iet[i]
Q
⌋
;
8 end
9 Compute the selected participant set P
′
and the
approximated optimal utility s with Alg. 1 using the
Ie
′
t[1, ..., n] as the utility input amplified to the integers;
10 return P′ and s;
is the maximum value in Iet[0, ..., n]. However, if we use 1-
dimensional array A[0, ...,
∑
Iet[i]] to store the current optimal
values and pass over this array i + 1 time, recalculating from
A[
∑
Iet[i]] to A[0] every time, we can obtain the optimal value
for only O(
∑
Iet[i]) space. However, Alg. 1 is not a fully poly-
nomial algorithm for participant selection. Since
∑
Iet[i] is not
polynomial in the length of the input of the problem, we con-
sider the algorithm is efficient only if
∑
Iet[i] is small or poly-
nomial in n.
To reduce the time complexity of Alg.1, we propose a fully
polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) [30] to select
participants for the task crowdsourcing. The basic idea of the
FPTAS is to ignore a certain number of least significant bits
of the utility, depending on the error parameter . Such that,
the modified utilities can be viewed as numbers bounded by a
polynomial in n and 1/. The pseudo code for the FPTAS is
described as Alg. 2.
4.2. Report Assessment and Rewarding Scheme
According to the participant selection scheme, the optimal
expected utility can be achieved from the task crowdsourcing.
However, due to the selfishness of the participants and uncer-
tainties, the quality of the sensing reports should be evaluated
to determine the trustworthiness and value of the sensing re-
ports. There has been a large number of research efforts on the
data quality assessment in the field of data mining [31, 32]. In
SACRM, we particularly focus on the two metrics, the veracity
and actual delay of the sensing reports.
Generally, a sensing task is outsourced to multiple partici-
pants in mobile sensing to ensure the veracity of sensing re-
ports. Similar sensing reports are mutually supportive to each
other, while conflicting or inconsistent reports compromise the
veracity of each other. Therefore, we can evaluate the verac-
ity of the sensing report based on the amount of supports and
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conflicts it obtains from other sensing reports. We group all the
reports for a specific sensing task t into a collectionCt and mea-
sure the data similarity for each report based on the similarity
function.
Assume that the similarity score S (srit, sr
j
t ) of any two sens-
ing reports srit and sr
j
t in Ct ranges from -1 to 1 [3, 31, 32],
where -1 means completely conflicting and 1 means exactly
consistent. Notably, since the similarity function design has
been widely studied [3, 33, 34], our focus is on how to utilize
the similarity scores determined by the similarity function to
evaluate the veracity of the report. We define the report verac-
ity assessment Φit of each sensing report sr
i
t in Ct as
Φit =
1 +
∑
i, j∈Ct ,i, j S (sr
i
t, sr
j
t ) · e−
1
|Ct |
2 · (|Ct | − 1) ,
where |Ct | is the number of sensing reports in the collection
Ct. The e
− 1|Ct | indicates the influence of the similarity score is
reduced with the decrease of the number of the sensing reports.
The actual report delay is another metric for the report qual-
ity assessment. Since the expected delay is considered in par-
ticipant selection as a crucial factor, the deviation between the
actual report delay and the expected delay should be introduced
into the report assessment to evaluate the timeliness. If the ac-
tual delay of ui is much larger than the expected delay, it would
cause a negative impact on the report assessment. Therefore, if
we denote adit as the actual delay of the participant i for the task
t, the delay deviation assessment ζ it can be defined as
ζ it =

1, if adit ≤ dit + σt;
1 − ϑ · (1 − e
(
dit+σt−adit
dt−dit−σt
)
·ϕ1
), if dit + σt < ad
i
t ≤ dt.
where σt is a delay adjustment factor for the task t; ϕ1 is an
amplification factor to amplify the effect of
(
dit+σt−adit
dt−dit−σt
)
on the
delay assessment, for instance, we can set ϕ1 = 5;1 − ϑ(1 −
1/e) as the lower bound of the delay deviation if adit ≤ dt, and
0 ≤ σt ≤ dt − max{dit}, 0 < ϑ ≤ 1. Since ϑ can be any real
number between 0 and 1, the delay assessment function can
be adaptive for different application requirements by adjusting
ϑ. Meanwhile, we consider the delay assessment score should
decrease with the increment of the delay deviation between the
actual delay and the expected delay. Therefore, we use 1 − ϑ ·
(1− e
(
dit+σt−adit
dt−dit−σt
)
·ϕ1
) to rate the delay deviation score. Although the
situation of adit > dt is not defined here, the sensing reports with
such situation should be identified as invalid for the task.
Based on the discussed two metrics above, we can integrate
them into a final report assessment function vit as follows.
vit = Γ(SRt, ad
i
t , d
i
t , dt) =
wx · Φit + (1 − wx) · ζ it , if adit ≤ dt;0, if adit > dt.
(8)
where wx is the weight of report veracity in the report assess-
ment and 0 ≤ wx ≤ 1. Note that, since both of the Φit and ζ it
range from 0 to 1, the vit should range from 0 to 1 too. With
the weighted integration of report veracity and delay deviation,
Algorithm 3: Report Assessment and Rewarding Scheme
input : The sensing report set {srt[1], ..., srt[n]}, the actual
delay set {adt[1], ..., adt[n]} and other inputs same
as Alg. 1;
output: The report assessment result set {vt[1], ..., vt[n]},
and the allocated reward set {rpt[1], ..., rpt[n]};
1 for i from 1 to n do
2 vt[i]← Γ(SRt, adit , dit , dt);
3 rpt[i]← ∆(vit, bit);
4 Allocate the reward rpt[i] to i;
5 end
6 return {vt[1], ..., vt[n]} and {rpt[1], ..., rpt[n]};
the report assessment can be adjusted to fit for the various task
requirements.
With the report assessment defined above, we dynamically
allocate the rewards to the participants. Denote the assessment
result of the sensing report srit as v
i
t. We define the reward allo-
cation function tpit as
tp jt = ∆(v
i
t, b
i
t) =
bit · e(v
i
t−vt(h))·ϕ2 , if vit < vt(h);
bit, otherwise.
(9)
where the vt(h) is the threshold of the report assessment result
determined by the task requirement, and 0 < vt(h) < 1; ϕ2 is
an amplification factor to amplify the effect of the vit − vt(h)
on the reward allocation, for instance, we can set ϕ2 = 2. If
the report assessment value is not less than vt(h), the sensing
report is identified as a good sensing report and the reward for
ui should be his bid price; otherwise, the sensing report would
be identified as a poor sensing report and the reward for the
participant i would be reduced with the decrease of the vit.
Based on the Eq. (8), (9), we describe the report assessment
and rewarding scheme by Alg. 3.
4.3. Reputation Management
Due to the selfishness of individuals, participants are eager
to obtain more benefits with fewer efforts in mobile crowdsens-
ing. Furthermore, there might be some malicious mobile users,
who maliciously participate a number of sensing tasks and sub-
mit bad sensing reports with a high probability to jeopardize the
mobile crowdsensing system. Although the report assessment
and rewarding scheme can economically punish poor sensing
reports and stimulate the improvement of report quality, it is
still crucial to establish a reputation system to provide a synthe-
sized evaluation on the the past sensing reports sent by each par-
ticipant. Different from the existing reputation systems which
only focus on the trustworthiness evaluation of participants, we
introduce the bid price into the reputation system to evaluate the
cost performance ratio of participants. The participant finish-
ing the sensing task with the same quality but with a lower bid
price should be rated a higher reputation by the data requester.
Consequently, the crowdsourcing cost and the quality of sens-
ing reports would be improved by the double stimulation (i.e.,
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Algorithm 4: Reputation Management Scheme
input : The report assessment result set {vt[1], ..., vt[n]}
and the bid price set {bt[1], ..., bt[n]};
output: The reputation set {rt[1], ..., rt[n]} for the task t;
1 for i from 1 to n do
2 rt[i]← Λ(vit, bit);
3 Integrate the rt[i] into ui’s final reputation R(ui) based
on Eq. (11);
4 end
5 return {rt[1], ..., rt[n]};
the trustworthiness and bid price evaluation in our reputation
system).
Denote the participant set by P, and vit as the assessment re-
sult of the sensing report srit, and b
i
t as the bid price of the partic-
ipant ui. Therefore, we define the reputation evaluation function
rit as
rit = Λ(v
i
t, b
i
t) =
κ · (1 − e
−vit/
∑
i∈P vit
bit/
∑
i∈P bit ), if vit ≥ vt(h);
− η, otherwise.
(10)
where κ is a reward factor and η is a punishment factor. To
stimulate a better report quality, the reputation evaluation func-
tion should be defined asymmetrically, which means η  κ. We
adopt a factor 1−e
vit/
∑
i∈P vit
bit/
∑
i∈P bit to simulate a higher cost performance
ratio.
Denote the final reputation of the participant ui in the plat-
form is R(ui), and the maximum and minimum reputation val-
ues are Rm and Rs. Then, we can integrate the reputation as
R(ui) =

Rs, if R(i) + rit < Rs;
Rm, if R(i) + rit > Rm;
R(ui) + rit, otherwise.
(11)
Based on the Eq. (10) and (11), we describe the reputation
management scheme by Alg. 4.
5. Performance Analysis
In this section, we theoretically analyze the performance of
the proposed participant selection algorithms.
Lemma 1. The time complexity and space complexity of Alg. 2
are both O(n3
1

).
Proof. According to Alg. 1, the time complexity of dynamic
programming is O(n
∑
Iet[i]) ≤ O(n · nIemaxt ).
In Alg. 2, we divide each utility by the factor Q =
 · Iemaxt
n
to a new utility Ie
′
t[i]. Therefore, the time complexity of Alg. 1
changes to O(n · nIemax′t ), where Iemax′t =
⌊
Iemaxt
Q
⌋
. It means
O(n · nIemax′t ) = O(n · n
⌊
Iemaxt
Q
⌋
= O(n2
⌊n

⌋
≤ O(n3 1

).
Similarly, we can prove the space complexity of Alg. 2
changes to O(n3
1

).
Lemma 2. Denote s as the output utility of Alg. 2, and opt as
the optimal utility. Then, we have s ≥ (1 − )opt.
Proof. Let P denote the optimal selected participant set, P
′
denote the selected participant set of Alg. 2. For any am-
plified utility Iet[i], because of the rounding down, we have
Iet[i]/Q − Ie′t[i] ≤ 1, where Q =
 · Iemaxt
n
. Therefore,∑
i∈P
let[i] − Q ·
∑
i∈P
Ie
′
t[i] ≤ nQ.
The dynamic programming steps return the optimal selected
participant set with the new utility set {Ie′t[1], ..., Ie′t[n]}. There-
fore,∑
i∈P′
Iet[i] ≥
∑
i∈P
Ie
′
t[i] ≥
∑
i∈P
Iet[i] − nQ =
∑
i∈P
let[i] − Iemaxt
Since for each i we have bit ≤ Bt, the optimal utility should
be not less than Iemaxt , i.e.,
∑
i∈P let[i] ≥ Iemaxt . Therefore,∑
i∈P′
let[i] ≥
∑
i∈P
let[i] − Iemaxt ≥ (1 − )
∑
i∈P
let[i].
Since let[i] = et[i] · δ and ∑i∈P′ let[i] = s · δ and ∑i∈P let[i] =
opt · δ, we have s ≥ (1 − )opt.
Theorem 2. Alg. 2 is a fully polynomial time approximation
scheme (FPTAS) for participant selection.
Proof. An FPTAS is an algorithm that takes an instance of an
optimization problem and a parameter  > 0 and in polynomial
time (both polynomial in n and 1/) produces a solution that is
within a factor (1+) of being optimal or ((1−) for maximiza-
tion problems). According to the Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we
can prove Alg. 2 is a FPTAS for participant selection.
6. Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of SACRM based on Java sim-
ulations. In our simulations, we setup 20 mobile users who
are interested in the published sensing task. The sensing task
has 10 interested social attributes and each mobile user has 10
social attributes. Therefore, the number of overlapping social
attributes ranges from 0 to 10. Each mobile user submits a ex-
pected delay to the data requester. The expected delay ranges
from 1 to 45. And the actual task delay follows a normal dis-
tribution where the expected value is the expected task delay.
The reputation of each user is randomly assigned, which ranges
from 0.1 to 1. If the reputation of a mobile user rp is below 0.3
is a dishonest user who submits bad sensing reports with a high
probability (1 − rp). And the user with reputation rp higher
than 0.3 would submit bad sensing reports with a probability of
0.4 × (1 − rp). The submitted report is assessed as a quality
score by our report assessment scheme. We use the sum of the
assessed quality scores as the crowdsourcing utility, denoted as
utility.
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6.1. Participant Selection Scheme Evaluation
In SACRM, we consider social attributes, expected delay and
reputation in our participant selection scheme. In this section,
we evaluate the effect of each factor on crowdsourcing by com-
paring our SACRM scheme with the Greedy Algorithm (GA)
where the participant with the lowest bid price has the priority
to be selected. In order to highlight the effect of each factor on
participant selection, the weights of the other two factors are
set to very low values (e.g., 0.05) to play a minor role in the
evaluation.
Fig. 3 shows the crowdsourcing utility comparison between
SACRM and GA. It is shown that both of the utility of the
SACRM and GA increase with the increasing task budget. It is
obvious that a higher task budget can recruit more participants
and create a higher utility. However, since GA does not con-
sider the social attributes, the utility of the SACRM is signifi-
cantly higher than the utility of the GA under each task budget.
It demonstrates that social attributes play a significant role in
participant selection and SACRM greatly improves the crowd-
sourcing utility. Fig. 4 shows the total actual delay comparison
between SACRM and GA. The total actual delay in this figure
means the sum of the actual delays of the submitted sensing re-
ports. Similar with the Fig. 3, a higher task budget indicates
more participants and higher total actual delay. Nevertheless,
the SACRM has a remarkably lower total actual delay than GA,
which indicates an enhanced crowdsourcing utility. The effect
of the reputation is evaluated in Fig. 5. In order to evaluate the
effect of the distribution of reputation values on SACRM, we
compare the performance of SACRM and GA under the random
distribution (RD) and normal distribution (ND). It can be seen
that the SACRM considering the reputation in participant selec-
tion brings a significantly higher crowdsourcing utility than the
GA, both in RD and ND. Meanwhile, since malicious mobile
users (i.e., the mobile users with low reputation values) are less
in ND than in RD, the utility of SACRM in ND is lightly higher
than in RD. This simulation result also proves that the distribu-
tion of reputation values has little impact on the performance of
SACRM. Therefore, combining Fig. 3, 4, 5, it can be demon-
strated that social attributes, expected delay and reputation are
necessary to be considered in participant selection and SACRM
leads to a significantly improved crowdsourcing utility.
Fig. 6 shows the performance comparison between SACRM
and GA under the increasing mobile users. As shown in this
figure, when the task budget is fixed, SACRM can produce an
increasing utility with a larger number of mobile users, while
the utility of GA fluctuates with the increment of mobile users.
It indicates that SACRM is scalable and can always achieve an
optimized utility by selecting the well-suited participants from
a set of mobile users. With the increment of mobile users, we
can have more choices to find the best-suited participants for
our task. That is why the expected utility increases with the
increasing mobile users. However, GA always chooses the mo-
bile user with lowest bid price for the task without considering
2RD means the reputation values of mobile users are followed by random
distribution, while ND means the reputation values of mobile users are followed
by normal distribution.
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the underlying relationship, which causes a low and fluctuating
utility curve.
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Figure 6: The Scalability of SACRM.
6.2. Rewarding and Reputation Management Scheme Evalua-
tion
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the dynamic
rewarding scheme and the reputation system in SACRM. In dy-
namic rewarding scheme, we set there is a participant k, and we
have dit = 20, dt = 40, wx = 60% and b
i
t = 1000. In reputation
management scheme, we set the threshold of the report quality
score to 0.35.
Fig. 7 shows the allocated reward comparison under differ-
ent report veracity scores. It can be seen that the allocated re-
ward under the lower actual task delay is higher than the other
one when the veracity score lies in [0, 0.6]. Moreover, the allo-
cated reward increases with the increasing veracity score until
it reaches the bid price. It indicates that a higher actual delay
means a lower reward with a high probability under the same
veracity score, and a higher veracity score brings a higher re-
ward in most cases. Fig. 8 depicts the allocated reward compar-
ison under different actual task delays. The change trend and
the meaning of this figure are similar with these of Fig. 7. Note
that, when the actual delay is larger than 40, the sensing report
is deemed to be invalid and hence the allocated reward drops
to 0. Fig. 9 is a 3D figure that shows the reward change trend
with the change of the veracity score and the actual delay of the
sensing report. It indicates that the task rewards are adaptively
allocated based on the report quality, which would economi-
cally stimulate the participant to improve their report quality,
including the report veracity and the report delay.
Fig. 10 shows the evaluated reputation value comparison un-
der different report quality scores. It can be seen that the eval-
uate reputation value are −200 in both BPPs when the report
quality score is below 0.35. Here, BPP means the percentage
of the bid price taking in the sum of all the bid prices. And the
reputation value changes to be positive and increases smoothly
with the increment of report quality score when the report qual-
ity score is higher than 0.35. Furthermore, at the same report
quality, the participant with a lower bid price will get a higher
evaluated reputation value. Fig. 11 depicts the evaluated rep-
utation value comparison under different bid prices. Since the
quality scores of the curves are higher than the report quality
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threshold, the reputation values here are both positive. How-
ever, it can be shown that when the bid price is the same, a
higher report quality score obtains a relatively higher reputation
value and when the quality score is the same, the reputation de-
creases with the increasing bid price. Fig. 12 is a 3D figure that
shows the change trend of the reputation under the change of
the participant’s bid price and his report quality score. It indi-
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cates that the participants would be stimulated to increase their
reputation values by improving the report quality and competi-
tively reducing their bid prices.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a Social Aware
Crowdsourcing with Reputation Management (SACRM)
scheme to select the well-suited participants and allocate the
task rewards in mobile sensing. In participant selection, the pro-
posed algorithms efficiently select the well-suited participants
for the sensing tasks and maximize the crowdsourcing utility.
Furthermore, the report quality is evaluated by the proposed re-
port assessment scheme, and the participants are economically
stimulated to improve their sensing report quality by our re-
warding scheme. In addition, the proposed reputation manage-
ment scheme reduces the crowdsourcing cost by introducing
the cost performance ratio of the participant in reputation eval-
uation. Theoretical analysis and extensive simulations demon-
strate that the SACRM scheme can significantly improve the
crowdsourcing utility, and is effective in stimulating the partic-
ipants to improve their report quality and reducing the crowd-
sourcing cost. In our future work, we will investigate the pri-
vacy and security issues of the SACRM scheme.
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